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This review article focuses on three recent publications – from academic, INGO, and 
institutional environments –  which offer potential new insights for peacebuilding and 
preventing conflict violence. The rationale for preventive response to warnings of 
imminent conflict seems glaringly obvious.  Effective early interventions might avert 
the humanitarian catastrophes of armed conflict, and should also cost far less in 
terms of development losses and political instability.  However studies such as those 
by Matveeva (2006), Mehler (2005), and Wulf and Debiel (2009) all appear to puzzle: 
why does the practice of conflict prevention appear so weak compared to its 
promise?  Beswick (2012) also shows how the EU turned out to be confused, 
random and re-active despite badging conflict prevention as a centre-piece of its 
foreign policy.  International responses are plagued by inconsistency, lack of co-
ordination, and political bias, aside from generally being reactive and ‘late’; they also 
tend to ignore local capacities and work with influential elites.   
 
 The three publications under review here mark a significant departure from ‘orthodox’ 
conflict prevention.  They focus focus on long-term, non-military approaches; local 
capacities and institutional mechanisms; and a more modest tone about what 
international partners could contribute.  
 
Preventing Violent Conflict is a complex, rewarding book. Although an edited volume 
with a dozen contributors, there is a sharp focus on a small number of key issues: 
these are elaborated in three theoretical chapters, and substantiated by original data 
collected for the book by fieldwork in ten Sub-Saharan African countries.  The 
editorial team includes Frances Stewart, originator of the ‘Horizontal Inequalities’ (HI) 
discourse, and Yoichi Mine, one of Japan’s leading Africanists.  Other editors and 
contributors are specialists from various countries including Belgium, Japan, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Tanzania and the US.  This range of expertise doubtless helps to avoid the 
Euro-centrism, ‘othering’, and Afro-pessimism that can mar much writing on Africa.  
The aim of the book is ‘to seek appropriate measures to prevent violent conflict in 
sub-Saharan African countries’, which it tries to achieve first, by identifying ‘a major 
part of the root causes of violent conflict’ (252); and second, providing policy advice 
to African governments and their international partners.  Original data concerning 
HI’s, perceptions, and political mechanisms are reported in about 100 tables and 
figures in addition to analytical interpretations.  
In academic and policy literature one finds numerous analyses of conflict causation, 
in Africa and elsewhere, including the well-worn ‘greed or grievance’ debates, the 
impact of ‘bad neighbourhoods’, youth demographics, availability of small arms, and 
others.  This book’s central thesis centres around three key ideas concerning HI’s as 
underlying factors in conflicts. First, ‘serious HI’s, political, socioeconomic and 
cultural, do exist in African countries’. Economic growth may reduce absolute poverty 
for many, but still not address HI’s. The second argument is that measurable or ‘real’ 
HI’s are often less important than judgements about them.  ‘People take actions not 
because of objective data on structural inequalities but because of their subjective, 
sometimes emotional perceptions about such inequalities’ (272). The third point is 
that perceptions of political exclusion often over-ride perceptions of socioeconomic 
inequality.  In brief, subjective perceptions by ethnic or other identity groups of 
 political marginalisation is a leading (though the authors admit, far from the only) 
cause of violent conflict. 
This analysis is complemented by studies on possible corrective measures. An 
important advantage of focus on political exclusion is that this diagnosis suggests a 
feasible treatment, namely constitutional engineering in favour of more balanced 
representation, to defuse perceptions of political marginalisation.  The authors argue 
that since there is fluidity in African constitutions and electoral mechanisms, serious 
attention should be given to political inclusion of identity groups as a major 
contribution to conflict prevention.  Compared to either military and security options; 
or long-term ‘development’ agendas; enhanced representation of formerly 
disempowered groups can in fact be achieved relatively quickly by African 
governments themselves, with or without international assistance. The book further 
analyses two main mechanisms for achieving outcomes: power-sharing and 
decentralisation.   A combination of both is termed ‘power-dispersing’, which the 
book argues has been the key factor in achieving a non-violent political environment 
in many of the case-studies.  However, the authors qualify this suggestion with two 
observations.  First, informal local leaderships and institutions are often as important 
as formal, national processes: they can either strengthen or undermine the success 
of formal reforms.  Second, there is no one ‘power-dispersing’ model.  Rather each 
particular situation will demand its own creative solution ‘taking fully into account 
idiosyncratic, historical traits of each society’ (273).   
Opting Out of War equally departs from the ‘early warning early response’ project.  
The authors are Mary Anderson, pioneer of the ‘Do no harm’ paradigm; and fellow 
CDA worker Marshall Wallace.  CDA has for more than two decades promoted the 
agenda of ‘local capacities for peace’, and has a rich collection of case-studies from 
which the authors argue that ‘local capacities … are more effective and more 
sustainable as the basis for policies and practices.’  The core argument of the 
present book is quite radical in its implications and articulates a perhaps unique 
approach to conflict prevention.  It is based on long-term fieldwork in what the 
authors call ‘nonwar communities’:  
 
A closer examination of areas of conflict reveals that, in the midst of war, 
some communities – sometimes quite sizable and significant – develop 
 strategies by which to exempt themselves from participation in surrounding 
violence.  … living in circumstances where all the forces and incentives that 
surrounded them  seemingly should have pushed them into conflict [they] 
somehow, as a group, decided not to fight.’ (2-3) 
 
The authors note that almost all conflict prevention paradigms are based on the 
notion of ‘bringing something new to conflict-prone environments’ and ‘most 
observers conclude that new systems need to be imagined and created’.  While 
external interventions may occasionally be helpful, the authors also argue that such 
‘helpful’ intervention is most often predicated on a lack of acknowledgement that 
‘systems and skills to prevent overt violence between groups already exist in every 
society. In fact, violence is regularly prevented even in conflict-prone areas.  Local 
people have structures and connections that they use to maintain peace day by day 
in their own space.’ 
The research agenda is therefore radically different from those of the international 
political/military bureaucracies. It also produced some surprises for the researchers, 
who found significant communities remarkably successful in avoiding war 
engagements. ‘Normal people leading normal lives have the option to say no to war.  
Normal leaders in systems that already exist can respond to and support people in 
nonengagement’ (12).  This claim sets the scene for five case study reports, 
supported by others which are not included in the book but available on the internet.  
Some key findings are that nonwar communities were almost all based on pragmatic 
considerations, and they ‘explicitly eschewed’ ideologies. I.e. they were not pacifists, 
nor antiwar activists, nor religious communitarians, nor seeking a particular solution 
or political change. They did not wish to promote any ‘universal values’ or ideological 
purity.  So one conclusion is that ‘attempts to maintain ideological purity in a complex 
world can, and too often, do, either result in irrelevance or, much worse, produce a 
chain of misunderstanding, intolerance, exclusion and dominance’. (173). 
Second, responsive and skilful community leadership was key to all the successful 
nonwar communities, but it was hardly ever framed in ‘good governance’ or 
‘democracy’ or ‘citizenship’ models.  Community members felt their strategic 
decision-making was consultative and inclusive; but seldom ‘democratic’ or 
 contentious.  Rather, each successful community’s decision-making was based, 
firstly, on indigenous traditions, but secondly on improvisation where, often in 
response to new challenges, the people themselves had updated their decision-
making strategies without reference to Western models.   
Third, most often, people reported that international influences had ‘fed into their 
disunity and subsequent intergroup violence’  and that international meddling was a 
root of their conflict (81); a limited number had received appropriate international 
support they considered helpful.    
In terms of critique of standard early warning/conflict prevention, the lessons the 
authors draw briefly is that we could be much more attentive to ‘existing systems that 
work’, rather than to warnings of negative factors and flashpoints.  ‘Many of our 
analytic systems emphasize weaknesses without concomitant care for identifying 
what is working (176). 
The book leaves open many questions that the authors are reluctant to address. The 
tentative suggestions at the end of the book seem to be that such communities can 
at least provide very useful lessons and resources for mediators; they provide 
options and alternatives for other communities; outsiders should avoid counter-
productive investments in military responses, and the default international position 
should be to not meddle; ‘they teach us that communities of people have the agency 
to shape things, even in face of seemingly awful odds’. (176) 
 
The WDR 2011 is available both as a full 400-page report, and as a 70-page 
overview. The report shows exemplary technical expertise and clarity. Its focus on 
violence prevention is perhaps surprising; a note explains that its aim is to improve 
the effectiveness of development interventions in places threatened or affected by 
large-scale violence, although ‘some of the ground that the Report covers falls 
outside the World Bank’s traditional development mandate’. (iv)  The WDR’s starting 
point is the concept of protracted violence, acknowledging that despite successes in 
reducing interstate war, ‘the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly 
either into ‘war’ or ‘peace’ or into ‘criminal violence’ or ‘political violence’ ….Many 
countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak 
governance, and instability’ (2).  
  
The report includes diagnosis and proposals for remedial action. The theory of 
conflict causation is, briefly, that the ‘risk of conflict and violence in any society 
(national or regional) is the combination of the exposure to internal and external 
stresses and the … social capability for coping with stress embodied in legitimate 
institutions’ (7).  While admitting numerous local factors and deviations, the analysis 
identifies three key stress points: security, employment, and access to justice. The 
central argument is that these stresses may be managed peacefully in societies with 
stable institutions, but they degenerate into armed conflict especially rapidly when 
the territory has a deficit of institutions perceived as legitimate (7).  The report 
explicitly takes a broad view of the term ‘institution’: 
 
Institutions are defined in the WDR as the formal and informal “rules of the 
game,” which include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms 
of behavior, and shared beliefs—as well as the organizational forms that exist 
to implement and enforce these norms (both state and nonstate 
organizations). Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and behaviors that 
can facilitate violence. Unlike elite pacts, institutions are impersonal—they 
continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular leaders, and 
therefore provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence. (41) 
 
The report also emphasises that conflict prevention and violence reduction is a long-
term process that must involve a deep transformation of government, society and 
institutions: models might be the progress of countries like Chile, Ghana, and South 
Korea over several decades, not the quick fixes of military intervention.  Based on 
case-study precedents, the report advocates a ‘top 5’ recommendations focusing on 
urgent priorities in security, employment and justice while working towards the 
longer-term structural improvements.  They include community-based programmes 
for violence prevention and access to local justice; job-creation programmes; the 
involvement of women in security, justice, and economic empowerment programs; 
focused anti-corruption initiatives. Potential roles for international partners, or donors, 
in this version of ‘conflict prevention’ are summarised as: specialized assistance in 
the core areas of citizen security, justice and jobs; acting on external stresses; and 
co-ordinating support from traditional with new donors such as middle-income 
 countries. The notion of a ‘security-development nexus’ is long-established, and 
often critiqued.  In figure 3.2 the report implies an extension into a ‘security-
development-diplomatic-humanitarian’ nexus, a shift from early warning to 
continuous risk assessment, and in short ‘a new way of doing business’ (29).  
 
2. A new way of doing business?  
 
None of the books reviewed argues against high-level preventive diplomacy to avert 
inter-state wars, or military protection of threatened vulnerable communities.  
However it seems to me they reflect a consensus of the need for a deep re-think of 
conventional EWER or conflict prevention models.  All three books propose a much 
stronger focus on local institutions, in the broad sense, as the central pillar of conflict 
prevention. Some areas highlighted in the books, and discussed below, are:  local/ 
international relations and the issue of meddling; long-term resilience rather than 
short-term ‘response’; constitutional engineering as a pragmatic and feasible 
structural measure alongside support for institutions (widely defined), jobs, security 
and justice; and violence reduction rather than conflict prevention.  
 
When I interviewed Mine, editor of Preventing Violent Conflict, he made the point 
that while his book was written with full academic independence, it was 
commissioned by the Japanese government’s official aid agency the Japan 
International Co-operation Agency (JICA), which is one of the largest in the world. 
‘So the message including its policy recommendations reflects the value and implicit 
knowledge of JICA, which I tried to accommodate.  We don’t really feel that JICA is a 
‘Northern’ organization, even though it can never be a ‘Southern’ organization. Well, 
this is all about the ambiguous position of this region in the world order. It was an 
excellent idea to also review the World Bank report, and that particular report in fact 
reflects the growing influence of China in the World Bank and as a donor.  With the 
growing wealth of China, I wonder if there will emerge some ‘East Asian’ modes of 
development support and engagement with conflict-affected societies?’  So perhaps 
we are starting to see an evolution in conflict prevention as in other areas, to reflect 





Relationships between the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ have dominated many 
debates in peacebuilding, with critiques of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and proposals for 
hybridity and local ownership.  The studies of conflict prevention seem to lead in the 
same direction.   
Weaknesses inherent in the orthodox model have become clear.  Invoking the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ agenda in the UN under certain specific conditions, the 
Security Council might indeed authorise a competent preventive intervention, with 
military support if necessary.  Most likely, the conditions would be: consensus, with 
no veto, among Security Council members; a very severe emergency such as 
genocide or ethnic cleansing; and operational feasibility.  Realistically, it might also 
depend on what other military actions were current at the time.   
 
However, for a threatened population to invoke international support in other 
circumstances seems fraught with difficulties.  For one thing, given the ‘strategic 
marginalization’ of many territories countries by the North, leverage would be small; 
while interventions in states which may be strategically critical (Somalia or Syria for 
example) may be not operationally feasible.  In either case, the decision on 
intervention is likely to be highly complex, involving many bureaucratic actors, and 
ultimately depending more on the political interests of the intervening powers than on 
the gravity or urgency of the actual threat.  Another level of complexity is that 
intervening forces would likely become embroiled in national politics, perhaps finding 
it difficult to avoid favouring one faction of elites.     
 
My reading of the books under review is that, perhaps with some rare exceptions, 
the authors would certainly welcome preventive diplomacy and, where appropriate 
mediations and peace conferences.  However, there would be a strong presumption 
against the effectiveness of a ‘warning-response’ model if it is taken to mean armed 
response.  Practical considerations mean that the warnings could well be ignored, 
with disappointment following false expectations.  Or, armed interventions even 





The corollary is to focus more on community resilience and local capacity-building for 
conflict emergencies, based on the assumption that interventions from outside 
agencies are likely to be too little, too late; and that in most cases the rhetoric of the 
EU, NATO and other ‘conflict prevention’ actors is likely to remain irrelevant to the 
daily concerns of people living in violence-prone environments. (Barrs 2006)   
Reducing harm from violence may have much to learn from work in the prediction of 
and preparedness for natural disasters.  The scientific community has been far more 
pro-active in using technologies such as crowd-sourcing and ‘big data’ in its work 
with natural disasters, for effective communication within and between local 
communities, and work has started on possibly applying some of these skills to 
conflict-affected regions (Mancini 2013 reports some early initiatives).   
 
How is resilience best developed?  If one is generally sceptical of outsider 
competence, would workshops on ‘democracy’ or ‘human rights’ be of any use to 
communities trying to negotiate pragmatically between armed groups?  Is there any 
reason for international visitors to offer technical assistance, or is it likely to disrupt 
already-effective networks of cell-phone users? The evidence from CDA is far from 
systematic or conclusive, but perhaps a minimalist support with networking and 
information might be helpful on occasion.  And reflecting back a ‘do no harm’, non-
meddling message to all outsiders might also be appropriate.  
 
Power-dispersal and institutional capacity 
 
While acknowledging the Opting Out of War insights, conflict prevention could be 
enhanced at levels higher than local communities, still stopping short of armed 
responses. The work on HIs and on institutional capacity provide many concrete 
suggestions.  Mine (2013) ends with ten policy recommendations directed at all 
actors with an interest in defusing conflict, whether they be political leaders, INGOs, 
or inter-governmental agencies. To summarise: 
 1/ The work of all government departments, aid agencies, development investments 
etc should be carefully reviewed to alleviate existing HIs, and especially not to 
exacerbate them.  
2/ Since perceptions can be as, or more, important than measurable outcomes, 
communication of equal treatment to all sectors of society should be prioritised. 
Different identity groups should be included in the planning and implementation of all 
development projects. 
3/ Conflicting parties should be encouraged to make power-sharing arrangements, 
and power-dispersal should be undertaken strategically.  As leadership quality is of 
prime importance, there should be good educational opportunities and mutual 
learning for young leaders.  (273-4) 
 
The ‘top 5’ recommendations of the WDR were reported above.   Although less 
focused than Mine’s, they tend in a similar direction: improving local institutions with 
a very broad definition, that could also include nonwar community structures; 
reducing inequalities; and addressing grievances.  Both sets of recommendations 
aim at structural, long-term changes, sustained by being integrated in national 
political and administrative systems, formal and informal.  However, they do not 
ignore the need to sometimes act urgently: in Mine’s suggestions, power-sharing for 
example after contested elections, though this may sometimes risk becoming an 
unsustainable ‘elite pact’; focus on job-creation and security for the WDR.  The roles 
of outsiders could be down-sized, especially for traditional donor or former colonial 
powers as the emphasis is on local institutional improvements.  
 
Security and violence reduction 
Organised, political violence has until recently been centre-stage of almost all 
academic, practitioner and policy debates: perhaps because Northern leaders felt 
potential threats from ‘terrorists’ based in unstable areas; because local elites were 
protected by international backers; or because public or political opinion occasionally 
demands action to halt particularly repugnant and visible conflicts.  More recently we 
can discern a shift of attention to violence prevention or violence reduction: among 
the most prominent have been initiatives on citizen security, mainly in Latin America.  
There has been an alarming escalation of homicide in Latin and South America, little 
of it connected to traditional political conflicts; rather, revolving around narcotics and 
 gang ‘wars’. Elsewhere, long after formal settlement of organised armed conflicts, a 
culture of violence became endemic: the failure of governments and their 
international partners to deliver legitimacy, justice, or jobs may generate societal 
violence on a massive scale without it quite passing a threshold into collective 
insurgency.  Other factors may well be the availability of arms, violent ideologies, 
high status of gang membership and so on.  
 
Third, the phrase ‘persistent conflict’ (apparently coined by the US military but 
following Azar’s ‘protracted social conflict’) notes that most conflicts do not end 
neatly: rather, they morph into complex combinations and recombinations of 
combatants with their own financial mechanisms.  It is probably high time to move on 
from the bell-shaped models that used to neatly depict ‘conflict phases’, in favour of 
acknowledging non-linear, messy, unpredictable mutations of dysfunctional and 
lethal social behaviours. How could ‘early warning’ and ‘conflict prevention’ operate 
in contexts of persistent, but not necessarily politicized, violence of the kind 
discussed by Rangelov and Kaldor (2012)? The ‘human security’ agenda touches on 
this, and ‘citizen security’ proposals encompass community-based initiatives, in co-
operation with more responsive and accountable local security agencies. This 
agenda gives more scope for consideration of gender and age issues, as women 
and young people are deeply affected by ‘cultures of violence’, while more young 




List of references 
 
 
Anderson, Mary and Marshall Wallace. 2013. Opting out of War: Strategies to Prevent 
Violent Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Baker, Bruce. 2012. State and substate policing in Africa and the boundaries between them. 
Global Crime 13 (4): 276-292 
Ban Kee-moon. 2012. ‘R2P10’. The Stanley Foundation. 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org//articles.cfm?id=724. (accessed 24 April 2014). 
 Barrs, Casey. 2006. Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who? The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance, Available at http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/category/casey-barrs 
(accessed 21 May 2014). 
Beswick, Terri. 2012. EU Early Warning and Early Response capacity for conflict prevention 
in the post-Lisbon era. Netherlands: Initiative for Peacebuilding  
Chabal, Patrick, Ulf Engel, and Annamaria Gentili. 2005. Is Violence Inevitable in Africa? 
Theories of Conflict and Approaches to Conflict Prevention. Boston; Leiden: Brill.  
 
DFID. 2011. Building Stability Overseas Strategy.  London: DFID. 
Dress Tobi P. 2005. Designing a peacebuilding infrastructure: Taking a systems approach 
to the prevention of deadly conflict. Geneva: The United Nations Non-Governmental 
Liaison Service (NGLS) 
Eriksson, John. 1996. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide Odense: Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 
Lund, Michael S. 2008. ‘Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice.’ In 
The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor 
Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, 287-321. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Matveeva, Anna. 2006.  Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical 
Dilemmas. European Centre for Conflict Prevention 
Mancini,  Francesco, ed. 2013. New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and 
Conflict. New York: International Peace Institute. 
Mehler, Andreas. 2005. Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies Towards Africa: The 
Conceptual Deficits of International Actors’ Approaches and How to Overcome Them.  
Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. GIGA Working Paper No. 4.  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=907268. 
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